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PE 204.419/fin. 
By letter of 9 March 1993, the Council requested the European Parliament to 
deliver an opinion, pursuant to Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, on the Commission 
proposal for a Council regulation establishing a Guarantee Fund. 
At the sitting of 12 March 1993, the President of Parliament announced that he 
had referred this proposal to the Committee on Budgets as the committee 
responsible and to the Committee on External Economic Relations and the 
Committee on Budgetary Control for their opinions. 
At its meeting of 27 January 1993, the Committee on Budgets had appointed Mr 
John Tomlinson as rapporteur. 
At its meeting of 30 September 1993 it examined the validity and appropriateness 
of the legal basis pursuant to Rule 36(3). By letter of 25 October 1993 it 
requested the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights. 
At its meetings of 20 September, 30 September and 25 October 1993 it considered 
the Commission proposal and draft report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the draft legislative resolution unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: von der Vring, chairman; Pasty, Vice-
Chairman; Tomlinson, rapporteur; Cassidy, Colom I Naval, Frimat, Goedmakers, 
Isler Beguin, Kellett-Bowman (for Forte), Langes, Napoletano, Samland and Wynn. 
The opinions of the Committee on External Economic Affairs and the Committee on 
Budgetary Control are attached. 
The opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights will be 
published separately. 
The report was tabled on 25 October 1993. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A. 
Commission proposal for a Council regulation establishing a Guarantee Fund 
Commission Text(l) Amendments 
(Amendment No. 1) 
1st citation 
Having regard to the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic 
Community, and in particular Article 
235 thereof, 
Having regard to the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic 
Community, and in particular Article~ 
203 and 235 thereof, 
(Amendment No. 2) 
1st recital 
Whereas the European Council, meeting 
in Edinburgh on 11 and 12 December, 
agreed that a Guarantee Fund should 
be established to cover loan 
guarantees to non-member countries; 
Whereas the Inter institutional 
Aqreement determines that a Guarantee 
Fund should be established to cover 
loan guarantees to non-member 
countries; 
(Amendment No. 3) 
7th recital 
Whereas, by reference to the practice 
of international financial 
institutions, a ratio of 10% between 
the Guarantee Fund's resources and 
guaranteed liabilities in principal 
would seem adequate; 
Whereas a target size for the 
Guarantee Fund is to be established 
by the budgetary authority in 
consultation with the Court of 
Auditors; whereas this target amount 
may not be set at less than 10% of 
total guaranteed liabilities but may 
be variable; 
(Amendment No. 4) 
8th recital 
Whereas initial payments to the 
Guarantee Fund equal to 14% of the 
amount of each operation would seem 
appropriate to attain this target 
amount; 
Whereas the Guarantee Fund should be 
constituted by means of an immediate 
payment from the Reserve of the 
entire target amount for the total 
outstanding liabilities. 
( 1) For full text see OJ No. C 68, 11.3.93, p. 10 
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commission Text Amendments 
(Amendment No. 5) 
9th recital 
Whereas, once this amount is 
attained, payments to the Guarantee 
Fund could then be limited to 10% of 
the amount of new operations; whereas 
if the Guarantee Fund exceeds this 
amount the surplus will be paid back 
to the budget; 
Whereas payments to the Guarantee 
Fund are thereafter to be a 
percentage of the amount of new 
operations eguivalent to the ratio of 
the target amount to total guaranteed 
liabilities; whereas if the Guarantee 
Fund exceeds this amount the surplus 
will be paid back to the budget; 
(Amendment No. 6) 
Recital lOa (new) 
Whereas it is necessary, in order to 
ensure maximum transparency of 
operations relating to the Fund, that 
all operations be recorded in the 
general budget, thus permitting the 
Court of Auditors to exercise their 
controls; 
(Amendment No. 7) 
Article 2, before first indent, new indent 
an initial pavment from the 
Guarantee Reserve corresponding to 
the entire target amount for the 
total outstanding liabilities l 
(Amendment No. 8) 
Article 2, before first indent, new indent 
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an initial payment from the 
European Investment Bank 
corresponding to. a certain percentage 
of the loans·advanced by the EIB and 
guaranteed by the Community, this 
percentage to be negotiated with the 
EIBl 
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Amendments 
Commission Text 
(Amendment No. 9) 
Article 2, first indent 
- payments from the general budget 
corresponding to a set percentage of 
each operation for a non-member 
country, decided on and committed by 
the Community and guaranteed by the 
budget; 
- payments from the general budget 
corresponding to a set percentage of 
each new operation for a non-member 
country, decided on and committed by 
the Community and guaranteed by the 
Community; 
(Amendment No. 10) 
Article 3, first paragraph 
The Fund shall rise to an appropriate 
level, known as "the target amount", 
determined by reference to guaranteed 
liabilities. 
The Fund shall be of an appropriate 
level, known as "the target amount", 
determined by reference to guaranteed 
liabilities. 
(Amendment No. 11) 
Article 3, second paragraph 
The target amount shall be 10% of the 
community's outstanding liabilities 
in principal arising from loans and 
loan guarantees granted by the 
Community. 
The target amount shall be 
established by the budgetary 
authority in consultation with the 
Court of Auditors as a ratio between 
the Fund's resources and the 
Community's total outstanding 
liabilities in principal arising from 
loans and loan·guarantees granted by 
the c~mmunity. 
(Amendment No. 12) 
Article 3, new third paragraph 
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The target amount shall not be set at 
less than 10% of total guaranteed 
liabilities, but may varv in 
accordance with the perceived risk of 
the portfolio. 
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Commission Text Amendments 
(Amendment No. 13) 
Article 3a (new) 
In accordance with the Financial 
Regulation, all operations relating 
to the Guarantee Fund are to be 
recorded in the general budget, 
either on the revenue or on the 
expenditure side. 
(Amendment No. 14) 
Article 4 
The payments provided for under the 
first indent of Article 2: 
- shall be equivalent to 14% of the 
value of the operation until the Fund 
reaches its target amount; 
- shall be reduced to 10% when the 
target amount is reached. 
Deleted 
(Amendment No. 15) 
Article 5, first paragraph 
If, as a result of the activation of 
guarantees, the resources in the Fund 
fall below 75% of the target amount, 
the rate of provisioning on new 
operations shall be raised to 15% 
until the target amount has been 
reached. 
If, as a result of the activation of 
guarantees, the resources in the Fund 
fall below 75% of the target amount, 
the rate of provisioning on new 
operations shall be raised to 20% 
until the target amount has been 
reached. 
(Amendment No. 16) 
Article 5, sec0nd paragraph 
If a guarantee is activated before 
the Fund reaches its target amount 
and the resources in the Fund fall 
below 75% of the target amount as a 
result, the rate of prov~s~oning 
shall be raised to 15% until the 
amount drawn has been fully restored. 
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Commission Text Amendments 
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(Amendment No. 17) 
Article 5, new last paragraph 
If the resources in the Fund are not 
sufficient to meet a guarantee or 
guarantees activated, the Community 
shall honour its obligations by 
drawing on its cash resources as 
provided for in Article 12 of council 
Regulation No. 1552/89 of 29 May 
1989. 
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A 
DRAFT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION 
embodying the opinion of the European Parliament 
on the commission proposal for a Council regulation establishing 
a Guarantee Fund 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the Commission proposal to the council (COM(93)0020) 1 • 
having been consulted by the Council pursuant to Article 235 of the EEC 
Treaty (C3-0119j93), 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the opinions of 
the Committee on External Economic Relations, the Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Citizens' Rights and the Committee on Budgetary Control (A3-0315j93), 
1. Approves the Commission proposal subject to Parliament's amendments and in 
accordance with the vote thereon; 
2. Calls on the Commission to amend its proposal accordingly, pursuant to 
Article 149(3) of the EEC Treaty; 
3. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament should it intend to depart from the 
text approved by Parliament; 
4. Calls for the conciliation procedure to be opened if the Council should 
intend to depart from the text approved by Parliament; 
s. Asks to be consulted again should the council intend to make substantial 
modifications to the Commission proposal; 
6. Instructs its President to forward this opinion to the Council and 
Commission. 
1 OJ No. C 68, 11.3.93, p. 10 
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EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Introduction; basic features of the proposal 
1. The Commission's proposal for a Guarantee Fund corresponds closely to 
the agreement reached by the Council at the December 1992 Edinburgh 
European Council, and indeed the first recital refers to this European 
Council. More to the point is that the present proposal conforms with 
the model in the draft Interinstitutional Agreement, and whereas the 
Commission's proposal does not refer to the Interinsti tutional Agreement 
with one word, it would seem appropriate to substitute some mention of 
this Agreement for that of the European Council in the first recital. 
2. Salient features of the proposal are: 
target size of the Fund 10% of the outstanding liabilities; 
Fund to be built up by remitting 14\ of each new operation giving 
rise to a liability; 
interest on resources invested, and late repayments by defaulting 
debtors also to accrue to the Fund; 
any excess amount in Fund to be paid back, to a special heading in 
the statement of revenue in the budget; 
Fund to be managed by the Commission. 
3. The Fund is to be fed by means of a Guarantee Reserve within the General 
Budget. The amount of the appropriations in the reserve for any one 
year of course sets an upper limit on how much may be paid into the Fund 
in that year. The reserve is to be operated along the lines of the 
monetary reserve of the EAGGF: resources will not be called up from the 
member states until payments are required to be made into the Fund. A 
corollary of this is that any resources that have not been called up 
into the Fund at the year end would never go into the Fund. 
4. In the Financial Perspective table of the conclusions of the Edinburgh 
summit, the Council expressed its intention to write 300 Mecus into the 
Reserve each year of the duration of the Financial Perspective. An 
appropriation of this size would permit the Community to enter into new 
loan or guarantee commitments towards non-member countries totalling 
300:0.14 • 2.143 Mecus per year. 
5. A simple equation permits the calculation of how long it will take to 
build up the fund to its target size of 10% of total outstanding loans 
and guarantees when the equivalent of only 14\ of new loans and 
guarantees is to be paid into the Fund. The answer is that the 
Community would have to advance new loans or guarantees worth 250\ of 
what has already been advanced before the Fund was at its target amount 
of 10\ of total outstandings (eg: if total outstanding& equal 1.000 
Mecus at present, the Fund would be at target size only when a total of 
3.500 Mecus had been advanced). This calculation of course takes no 
account of interest income on Fund resources invested, which would also 
accrue to the Fund, but nor does it take account of the risk (or 
likelihood) of defaults occurring in the meantime. 
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Risk to the budget 
6. The Commission has furnished Parliament with a number of documents 
throwing light onto the amount of total outstanding loans and 
guarantees. An annex to the 1993 general budget shows that, as of 31 
December 1991, outstanding operations outside the Community and covered 
by the budget totalled 2. 660 Mecus. The Commission's more recent report 
COM(93)174 of 3 May 1993 gives a comparable figure for year-end 1992 of 
no less than 4.249 Mecus, an increase more than 50% in just 12 months. 
It should be emphasized that this figure is merely the total amount of 
capital still to be repaid on a variety of dates in the future: the 
underlying facilities - the maximum amounts of capital authorized for 
each operation - add up to a much greater figure, 12.117 Mecus, where 
the difference arises from the fact that not all facilities are fully 
drawn down. 
7. The following table shows the total capital outstanding, in Mecus: 
BENEFICIARY AUTHORIZED AMOUNT AMOUNT 
CEILING OUTSTANDING OUTSTANDING 
31.12.1991 31.12.1992 
A. Financial Assistance 
1. Hungary 1050 710 710 
2. Czechoslovakia 375 185 375 
3. Bulgaria 290 150 290 
4. Algeria 400 247 250 
s. Israel 160 160 
6. Romania 375 375 
7. Ex-USSR 1.250 123 
B. Other 
8. EIB Mediterranean 6.017 1.340 1.444 
9. EIB Cent & East Euro 1.700 28 147 
10. Guarantee, CIS 500 375 
TOTAL 12.117 2.660 4.249 
Sourcea Commissiondoc. COM(93)174 
The figures in the above table even those under the heading 
"authorized ceiling" - do not in all cases amount to the total risk,. as 
they do not include interest that will accrue to the loans advanced. 
8. Items 1 to 7 in the table concern loans raised by the Community itself 
for on-lending to non-Community countries; items 8 to 10 represent loans 
advanced by financial institutions (in the case of 8 and 9, the European 
Investment Bank) against a Community guarantee, where the Community 
guarantee for EIB loans to the Mediterranean countries only covers 75\ 
of the credit lines. 
9. Since last autumn, your rapporteur has furthermore presented to the 
Committee a draft opinion on a Commission proposal to provide medium-
term financial assistance to the Baltic States (up to 220 Mecus over 7 
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years) and draft reports on Commission proposals to extend the Community 
guarantee to the EIB to cover losses under loans to the Baltic States 
(of up to 200 Mecus over 3 years), to "certain countries outside the 
Community" (of up to 250 Mecus per year for 3 years), and to Albania (of 
up to 50 Mecus over 3 years). 
10. The annex reproduces parts of two tables that are given in the 
Commission's document COM(93)174, and which attempt to illustrate on a 
year-by-year basis the risk to the Community budget of loans and 
guarantees advanced and committed. Table 1 shows the estimated amount 
of principal and interest due each financial year for loans actually 
paid out: here, the capital to be repaid corresponds to the amount 
outstanding. Table 2 shows the corresponding figures for loans actually 
disbursed, plus agreed loans still awaiting disbursement, plus loans 
proposed by the Commission but still awaiting decision. Here the 
capital to be repaid corresponds to the ceiling on loans authorized and 
loans proposed but awaiting decision. 
11. It needs to be reiterated that these tables represent the situation as 
at 31 December 1992, and as has already been shown (paragraph 9), 
Parliament has reported on a number of proposals since then (though, of 
course, some of these recent proposals may be included in table 2). It 
should also be pointed out that not all existing facilities have final 
maturities in or before 1999: as the Commission itself remarks in its 
document, "the loans (from the EIB and benefitting from the Community 
guarantee, authorized ceiling in excess of 7,500 Mecus on 31 December 
1992) are generally for 15 years with 3- to 4-year periods of grace on 
capital repayments". Finally, we know already now that repayments of 
the 500 Mecus in loans to the CIS against the Community guarantee are 
in doubt since a default on a payment in March 1993, and subsequent 
negotiations on rescheduling of the entire debt. 
12. What the tables do show is that payments are scheduled to increase 
massively towards the end of the decade on loans that had already been 
disbursed on 31 December 1992, exceeding 1.000 Mecus in 1995 and 1997, 
and not surprisingly that the figures are even greater when operations 
decided or merely proposed by the Commission are included: more than 
2.300 Mecus in 1995, for example. 
13. More recent figures (March 1993), which do not include EIB lending 
against the Community guarantee, show little change in comparison to 
table 1 (annex) in the expected payments in 1993 and 1994 on the 
Community's own loans to countries outside the Community. When EIB 
lending is included, there are small increases in the later report 
covering 1993 and 1994. 
14. This is not the place to attempt a detailed analysis of the economic 
situation - and, by extension, the likelihood of full repayment of all 
the loans advanced - in each of the beneficiary countries. The 
Commission makes some comments in COM(93)174, but the situation is 
changing all the time, particularly in the states of the former Soviet 
Union and the former Yugoslavia, the beneficiary of authorizations 
totalling 760 Mecus under the Community's Mediterranean protocols, and 
the situation must be said to be precarious in all the states of the 
former Soviet block. But it might be appropriate to examine whether the 
Fund as proposed appears to be adequate to the task at hand. 
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Adequacy of the Fund 
15. It has already bean shown that, at a provisioning rate of 14% of new 
loans and guarantees, the Fund will only be at its target size of 10% 
of total outstanding& when further loans and guarantees to a value of 
250\ of what has already been lent, hava been advanced. Simple 
extrapolation from the table above (paragra~h 7) would suggest that 
total outstanding& currently amount to well over 5.000 Mecus, but even 
if we stick to a figure of 4.000 Mecus, this would mean that the Fund 
would not be at its target size before a further 10.000 Mecus had been 
advanced. This figure of course takes no account of future events such 
as repayments of present outstandings, further drawdowns under existing 
facilities, possible new facilities, and defaults. But the calculation 
gives an idea of the order of magnitude of the figures involved. It has 
also bean shown how the proposed appropriation for the Guarantee Reserve 
in the budget effectively sets an upper limit of approx 2.000 Mecus per 
year in new lending. By this rough calculation, then, it would be at 
least five years before the Fund had reached its target size. 
16. In article 5 of the proposed Regulation the Commission is proposing that 
if, as a result of a guarantee being called, Fund resources fall below 
75\ of the target amount, the rate of provisioning is to be raised from 
14\ to 15\ (of new loans/guarantees) until the target amount has bean 
made up1 and if resources were to fall to below 50% of the target 
amount, the budgetary authority would have to decide on (extraordinary) 
measures to replenish the Fund. It seems to your rapporteur that this 
is a clear admission by the Commission that it is not acceptable to have 
Fund resources at too low a level. And yet, at present Fund resources 
stand at zero, and the Commission proposes constituting it by paying in 
only l!! of new engagements. 
17. It is appropriate to question whether the requirement for resources to 
meet any calls on the budget under guarantees issued by the Community 
really would be beat met by means of a Guarantee Fund which was to be 
drip-fed resources by means of a rather cumbersome procedure such as 
that outlined in the proposal. 
18. The drawbacks of this proposal are many: foremost among them is the 
question of what would happen in the not unlikely scenario where the 
Fund was not big enough to meet a call on it. It has been the 
consistent position of the Budgets committee that any shortfall should 
be met not by lifting resources from the other headings of the budget, 
be they inside or outside category 4, but by raising the ceiling for 
category-4 appropriations and with it the overall budgetary ceiling. 
Proponls 
19. Given the severity of the problems being faced by the states of central 
and Eastern Europe, it is quite likely that it will be at the beginning 
of the lifetime of the Guarantee Fund that it will face its severest 
teat. Thus, in connection with the starting-up of the Fund, an 
evaluation of the overall risk of the portfolio should be made, possibly 
in consultation with the Court of Auditors. On the basis of this 
estimated risk, and with due regard to the availability of resources 
under the Financial Perspective, a one-off payment corresponding to a 
certain percentage of all outstanding liabilities should be made into 
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the Fund. This one-off payment would have no effect on the subsequent 
consolidation of the Fund by means of the step-by-step provisioning as 
proposed by the Commission. 
20. Intuitively, it would make sense if the size, in percent, of the one-off 
payment were to be identical to the target &ize of the Fund, so that 
subsequent provisioning could take place at the same rate (i.e., if the 
target size is set at 10\ of total outstandings, then 10\ of total 
present outstanding& should be paid into the Fund immediately and 
provisioning then continue at 10\ of all new loans and guarantees). 
21. Should the situation in spite of this arise where the Fund was not big 
enough to meet a call or calls on it, the Commission would be empowered 
to draw on its accounts with the treasuries of the member states to meet 
any shortfall, in accordance with article 12 of Council Regulation (EEC, 
EURATOM) No 1552/89 on the Communities' own resources. According to 
paragraph 3 of art. 12, the Commission may draw in excess of the total 
of the assets of these accounts in cases of default under a loan 
contracted pursuant to Council Regulations and Decisions where there 
were no other means of meeting the Community's commitments to lenders, 
even if such a drawdown were to mean that the limit for own resources 
entered in the budget were to be exceeded. 
22. concerning the question of the risk to the Communities' resources, it 
seems to the rapporteur that this is a suitable opportunity to consider 
the question of whether it is at all appropriate for the Community to 
be granting guarantees of the full 100\ of the value of loans being 
advanced by the EIB or by commercial banks. Up to the present, the 
Community has assumed the role of banker, by trying to evaluate the risk 
of lending to certain debtors, and then assuming this risk by issuing 
guarantees against its budget to the lending banks. The return on the 
risk, on the other hand, has accrued not to the Community budget but to 
the lending banks - and in the case of the EIB, through which most of 
the Community's lending is channelled, this return can be interpreted 
as a refund to the member states, in that it is used to increase the 
Bank's capital - a responsibility that could otherwise have fallen to 
the treasuries of the member states. 
23. There would appear to be two ways of countering this inconsistency. The 
liB could be required to assume a share of the risk of certain loans, 
with the guiding principle that, if the project in question was one 
which the EIB might consider even in the absence of the Community 
guarantee, then it should shoulder a share of the riek, but if the 
project was one the BIB would not even look at, but which the Community 
wAftted to support for political reasons, then the guarantee should cover 
it completely. The Bank would naturally raise practical, legal and 
financial objections to any such proposal and could perhaps justifiably 
argue that any downgrading in its financial rating that were to result 
from a sharp deterioration in the quality of its portfolio would be to 
the detriment of the entire Community. 
24. The alternative would be for the Bank to make a direct contribution to 
the Guarantee Fund in return for the comprehensive cover of the 
community's guarantee. The Bank would naturally be entitled to 
oompaaeation for the administrative work involved in identifying and 
•.-mta'ng projecte, but this payment should be commensurate with the 
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resources expended and no more. A one-off, or annual payment to the 
Guarantee Fund, or one that was related to the volume of loans advanced, 
should pose no risk of compromising the Bank's rating, as the payment 
would bear no direct relationship to the quality of the loans advanced. 
25. In this connection, it should be noted that the EIB in each of financial 
years 1992 and 1992 made profits of approximately ECU 1 billion on total 
I interest receivable and similar income of ECU 6.2 bn (1991) and ECU 7.2 
bn (1992). In 1992, there remained a profit of 969 Mecus even after 150 
Mecus had been transferred to an internal Fund for general banking 
risks, and it was being proposed that these 969 Mecus be appropriated 
to the Bank's Additional Reserves. 
26. Your rapporteur also proposes that the "emergency" provisioning rate for 
circumstances where the resources in the Fund had fallen below 75\ of 
the target amount should be raised from the proposed 15\ to 20%, 
reflecting the concern the budgetary authority would attach to any major 
depletion of the Fund's resources. 
27. The question of whether 10\ of total outstanding& really is an adequate 
size for a fund guaranteeing loans to debtors of the quality of those 
with which this proposal is concerned, is one that should be addressed 
by the Court of Auditors, and the Commission is indeed proposing that 
the opinion of the Court be sought. It could be envisaged that 
agreement will be reached on a variable target size for the Fund, 
permitting account to be taken of the perceived riskiness of the 
portfolio of outstandings. 
28. Finally, steps should be taken to ensure the maximum transparency of all 
operations relating to the Fund. Thus all operations, on both the 
revenue and expenditure sides, should be recorded in the general budget 
in accordance with the procedures set down in the Financial Regulation. 
This would also permit the Court of Auditors to exercise control over 
the operation of the Fund. 
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Annex 1 
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OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on External Economic Relations 
for the Committee on Budgets 
Craftsman: Mr Gerd LEMMER 
At its meeting of 2 April 1993 the Committee on External Economic Relations 
appointed Mr Lemmer draftsman. 
At its meetings of 2 June, 1 July and 20 September 1993 it considered the draft 
opinion. 
At the last meeting it unanimously adopted the conclusions as a whole 
unanimously. 
The following took part in the vote: De Clercq, chairman; Cane Pinto, 
vice-chairman; Stavrou, vice-chairman; Lemmer, draftsman; Benoit, Mihr, Peijs, 
Sainjon, Suarez Gonzalez and Visser (for Rossetti). 
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I. I.OAiftr DD Gt1ARAI'f"1"DS POR NOII-BC COtnn'RIES: A GROWIIm RISX POR THE l!:C 
BUDCift 
1. The Committee on External Economic Relations has supported all of the 
Commission's proposals to the affect that loans granted by the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and other medium-term financial assistance mechanisms, 
including support for the balance of payments (on which the committee is 
drawing up a report for Parliament), should be underwritten from the EC 
budget. 
At the same time, however, while supporting and justifying financial 
assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the committee has 
also drawn attention to the importance of constant monitoring of financial 
developments and examination of the real probability of repayment of th~ 
loans made to these countries, and to the risk entailed by creating 
expenditure within the BC budget which is not covered in the proper manner. 
2. In this connection, the Committee on External Economic Relations has 
repeatedly drawn attention to the rapid increase in the budgetary guarantees 
which the Community has had to grant over the last few yaars 1 • Suffice it 
to say that the financial resources supplied by the Community since 1990 -
1ustifiably - to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS 
states ~ have exceeded ECU 7000 million. What is the total sum of 
guarantees and loans to third countries underwritten by the Community? What 
legal mechanisms exist to ensure that such budgetary guarantees can be 
fulfilled in the event of default by the beneficiary of a loan? What is the 
approximate maximum risk to the Community budget represented by loans to 
third countries? 
3. The table in the annex shows a breakdown by country of figures for three 
basig indigators, showing the size of loans to third countries underwritten 
from the Community budget and the theoretical potential risk relating to 
their repayment. 
(a) The 'maximum total of loans authorized' includes all lending operations 
on which a decision has already been taken and those proposed by the 
Commission which have not yet been adopted by the council. The overall 
total at the end of 1992 was ECU 14 431 million, of which 49.2\ (7104 
million) was earmarked for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and 45.6\ for the Mediterranean countries. The remaining 5.2 \ 
represents the 750 million ceiling recently fixed by the EIB for the 
funding of projects in Asian and Latin American countries. 
1 
Clearly, this 'total' does not represent the total risk to the EC 
r budget, since it does not include interest owed. 
See ita reports on financial assistance: A3-328/91, A3-0265f92, A3-0324j92 
and A3-0325/921 and ita opinions on underwriting EIB loans included in the 
following reports by the Committee on Budgets: A3-0038f9l, A3-0010f92 and A3-
0107/93. 
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(b) The 'current balance on loans' on a particular date (31 December 1992) 
indicates the amount of capital still to be repaid in relation to the 
loans already disbursed. 
At the end of 1992 the current balance totalled ECU 4249 million, as 
opposed to ECU 2660 million a year previously, which goes to show above 
all the the growing momentum of Community aid and EIB loans to the 
countries of central and Eastern Europe. 
(c) The 'maximum risk' is calculated on the basis of the capital instalment 
to be repaid and interest due for each budgetary year. According to 
Commission information, the maximum risk accumulated up to the year 2000 
lies between ECU 5422 million <minimum> (taking into account only loans 
disbursed up to 1992) and ECU 13 388 million <maximum) (taking into 
account all loans authorized up to 1992). 
The growth in the risk shows that repayments will rise very considerably 
during the second half of the nineties, reaching ECU 2300 million by 
1995. 
4. The Community legal framework provides for mechanisms enabling budgetary 
guarantees to be implemented; in particular, by drawing provisionally 
on cash resources as provided for in Article 12 C 3 l of Council Regulation 
<EEC, Euratom> No. 1552/891 implementing Decision 88/376/EEC, Euratom 
on the system of the Communities' own resources. 
1 
The mechanism works as follows: since the Community guarantee takes the 
form of a token entry (p.m.) under the appropriate budget items, in the 
eyent of default by a country receiving a loan the Commission has to 
honour the loan guarantee by drawing on the cash resources made 
available to it by the treasuries of the Member States. If the size of 
the default exceeds the cash resources, the Commission can transfer 
resources from any item in the Community budget. Finally, in the 
hypothetical event of defaults exceeding the limit determined by the own 
resources available under the Community budget as a whole, the 
Commission could call on the treasuries of the Member States to 
guarantee repayments exceeding the limit set by the Community's own 
resources, in order to ensure the servicing of the debt of which it is 
guarantor. 
As may be seen, not only does this mechanism operate automatically 
(there being no need for prior authorization from the Budgetary 
Authority to increase the budget items concerned), but it may also 
affect the speed of application and proper implementation of other 
commynity policies. 
ror the first time in the Community's financial history, the EIB made 
use in 1987 of the budgetary guarantee entered as a token entry in the 
budget, for the sum of ECU 4 million, in connection with a loan granted 
to Lebanon. Over the last two years, the EIB has called for the 
implementation of the budgetary guarantee for a sum of ECU 8.5 million, 
in connection with the default on repayment of loans by the republics 
OJ No. L 155, 7.6.1989, p. 5 
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of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia). 
However, given the calendar gf lgan expiry dates for the next few years, 
fY!Fytbinq would .,. to igdicate that there may be a considerable 
ioqr!JBI in the tcale of potential default cases. 
S. In view of this situation, the Committee on External Economic Relations 
felt that the measures for which provision is made in Parliament's 
resolution on the Delors II package (A3-0209/92) were urgent and 
indispensable: 
the establishment of an alarm system for the cases where the 
guarantees provided by the community is required to honour its 
loan guarantees, and, 
the creation in the Community budget of a reserve for the sole 
purpose of covering extraordinary expenditure of this type; the 
minimum value of such a reserve would be 20\ of existing 
guarantees. 
II. CXIMMEHiS OR 'i'R'E' COIIIHISSION' PROPOSAL 
6. In response to the decision of the Edinburgh European Council to set up 
a guarantee Fund to cover loans to third countries, the Commission 
presented a proposal for a regulation (COM(93) 20 final), the main 
features of which are as follows: 
the Fund will be an instrument to complement existing mechanisms, 
its purpose being to ensure the implementation of budgetary 
guarantees in respect of non-member country or a person not 
resident in the Community. In other words, the Fund's objective is 
to reinforce the provisional use of cash resources in order to 
avoid any disruption of the implementation of the budget in the 
event of non-payment1 
the purpose of the Fund is to facilitate the establishment 
alongside the budget of financial resources to enable the 
Community to cope better with the risks entailed by non-payment. 
The Fund will rise to an appropriate level, known as the 'target 
tmount', which the Commission has set at 10 \ of outstanding 
liabilities in principal1 
the Fund will be endowed by payments from the general budget (the 
'guarantee reserve'), corresponding to 14 \of the amount of each 
new lending operation decided on and committed by the community; 
The Fund will be administered by the Commission. 
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Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Fund will be constituted 
through the gradual transfer of resources from a 'guarantee reserve' 
under the general budget. The only indication to date of the level of 
endowment of the guarantee reserve is that given in the concluPions of 
the Bdinburgh sUIIIIita BCU 300 million annually for the period of 
application of the l'inancial Perspective (1993-1999). This sum is a long 
way from the ECU 600 million proposed by the Commission for 1~97 under 
the Delors II package (COM(92) 2000 and 2001). 
7. In the draftaman's view, the essential question is whether the 
legislative provisions established by the Commission proposal for the 
Guarantee l'und will suffice to cover the risks to which the Community 
budget is exposed at a time when the situation in Eastern Europe is 
changing very rapidly and in a transitional phase when the risk of 
default is far higher than usual. 
As regards the endowment of the guarantee reserve, the draftsma.n takes 
the view that the 300 million earmarked may prove manifestly inadequate 
to cover the high quantitative and qualitative risk which must be faced 
over the next few years. 
On the one hand, the ECU 300 million proposed for the endowment of the 
reserve has established a de facto maximum limit of some ECU 2100 
million (3001 0.14 • 2143> annually for the new loans. On the other 
hand, with a level of provisioning of 14 \ on each new lending 
operation, the fund will not reach the 'target amount' of 10 \ of the 
current balance until new loans and guarantees for another ECU 10 000 
million (equivalent to 250 \ of the amount already loaned) are granted. 
In other words, it would take at least five years for the Fund to reach 
ita target volume. 
In view of the above figures and the risk they imply for the proper 
budgetary implementation of other Community policies, the Committee on 
External Economic Relations believes that there is a vital need for 
better cover for the risk to the Community budget of the non-repayment 
of loans granted to non-community countries and, in this connection, 
proposes that any revision of the legal provisions of the Guarantee Fund 
take the following considerations into account: 
(a) the Fund's 'target amount' and the endowment of the 'guarantee 
reserve' should be more flexibly defined. The definition of both 
parameters should take into account not only the current balance 
of the capital sum, but also the interest due, as well as an 
analysis of the risk involved and its development over time; 
(b) in view of the initial situation - a current balance of ECU 4249 
million without provisions - and the growing risks involved, it 
would be advisable to examine the three options below: 
to establish an special endowment for the guarantee reserve, 
taking into account the current balance as at 31 December 
1992, 
to increase the level of provisioning of the Fund in order to 
reach the 'target amount' as soon as possible. Thus, if the 
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rata of provisioning rises to 20\ of the new loans and 
guarantees, the target amount will be reached in under three 
years, 
to increase the endowment of the guarantee reserve, which 
would make it possible to constitute the Guarantee Fund more 
quickly and would give the Community' a external economic 
policy greater room for manoeuvre; 
(c) the Court of Auditors should be involved in deciding on any 
variable target amount. 
a. Furthermore, the Commision proposal gives no information on a number of 
important aspects; 
What level of guarantee should be granted? The draftsman takes the 
view that it should be consonant with the level of the risk 
(political or economic) threatening the country receiving the loan 
or guarantee; 
What arrangements or procedure for covering risks will be applied 
if the Guarantee :rund proves inadequate, in order not to interfere 
with the proper implementation of Community policies? This point 
should be resolved in the context of the revision of the 
interinstitutional agreement; 
What is the mechanism for monitoring changes in the risks involved 
and only departure from the average pattenr predicted? The 
proposal fails to meet Parliament's request for the establishment 
for a rapid alarm system (see paragraph 6), which would enable the 
Budgetary Authority to carry out effective monitoring. 
9. In making the above observations, the draftsman was aware of the 
underlying dilemma to be faced when endowing the Guarantee Fund and the 
corresponding budgetary reserve; given the budgetary problems facing 
moat of the Memb!r States, the European Council and the Commission have 
opted for.a minimalist approach. However, the Committee on External 
Economic Relations takes the view that the magnitude of the risks 
involved and their possible impact on other Community policies require 
a larger quantitative commitment by the community as regards this 
essential instrument for the support of its cooperation policy with 
third countries. 
rrr com::r.tJSrOJJS 
10. 'l'he Committee on External Economic Relations calls on the committee 
responsible to include in its report the following conclusions: 
1. Supports the Commission proposal for the establishment of a 
Guarantee Fund outside the Community budget to cover the financial 
risks entailed by the granting of loans to non-community 
countries; in this connection, considers that this proposal will 
help to rationalize the way in which guarantees are dealt with 
under the Community budget and to reduce the risk of automatic 
redeployment of budgetary resources earmarked for community 
policies in the event of activation of the guarantee. 
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2. Proposes, in order to ensure better cover of the political and 
economic risks associated with the loans already granted to the 
countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean basin, that the 
Fund's 'target amount' be constituted in a flexible manner, so as 
to take into account not only the current balance of the capital, 
but also the interest due; considers, moreover, that the 'target 
amount' should be raised to the appropriate level as soon as 
possible, and, in this connection, supports the proposal that the 
level of provisioning of the Fund be raised to 20 \ of the amount 
of each new loan. The Budgetary Authority should be involved in 
defining the limits of the said 'target amount'. 
3. Stresses that the annual endowment of the guarantee reserve should 
be determined on the basis of a systematic analysis of the 
quantitative and qualitative risk incurred. The Court of Auditors 
should help to carry out such analyses. 
4. Points out that it would be advisable to establish a special 
endowment for the guarantee reserve, to provision the current 
balance outstanding; 
s. Considers that the level of cover of the guarantee of each loan 
should depend on the political or economic risk threatening the 
beneficiary country. 
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! NON-COMMUNITY COUNTRIES MAXIMUM SUMS OUTSTANDING TOTAL 
RECEIVING ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED LIABILITIES ON THEORETICAL 
31.12.1992 MAXIMUM RISK 
FOR THE PERIOD 
1993-2000 
A. liiAIQiftL A88ISTINCI 
1. Hungary I 870 610 ) 1495 
Hungary II 180 100 ) 
2. Czechoslovakia 375 375 584 
3. Bulgaria I 290 290 ) 588 
Bulgaria II 110 - ) 
4. Romania I 375 375 ) 762 
Romania II 80 - ) 
5. Former USSR I 1250 123 1533 
6. Baltic States 220 - 385 
7. Ilrael 160 160 240 
8. Algeria 400 250 637 
9. EURATOM - countries of 
E. and c. Europe 1124 
-
678 
B, GUMM'J.'IBS 
10. EIB countries of E. 
and c. Europe 1750 137 1423 
11. EIB - Mediterranean 
• Old protocol• 3032 ) ) 
• New protocol• 1185 ) 1444 ) 4320 
• Financial cooperation 1800 ) ) 
12. EIB (Developing countries 
in Aaia and Latin America) 750 
-
295 
13. Former USSR 
(500m guarantee) 500 375 448 
mDie 14 431 4 249 13 388 
Ea a tern Europe 7 104 2 395 7 896 
Mediterranean 6 577 1 854 5 197 
Developing countries 
in Aaia and Latin 
America 750 
-
295 
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OPINION 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Budgetary Control 
for the Committee on Budgets 
Draftsman: Mr Georgios ZAVVOS 
At its meeting of 29 March 1993 the Committee on Budgetary Control appointed Mr 
Georgioa ZAVVOS draftsman. 
At its meeting of 6 October 1993 it considered the draft opinion. 
At the last meeting it unanimously adopted the conclusions as a whole. 
The following took part in the vote: Blak, acting chairman; Theato, acting 
draftsman, Dalsass (for Langes), McMahon (for Wynn), Marck, Nielsen and Pasty. 
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Il!'l'BOI)OO'liOl! 
The proposal for a Council decision under examination here 1 gives concrete form 
to the decision taken at the European Council in Edinburgh to set up a guarantee 
fund to cover the Community's contingent liabilities relating to loans to non-
Member countries. In principle, the European Parliament can only welcome this 
proposal, insofar as over the last few years it has frequently requested the 
creation of such a guarantee fund. 
The rapporteur's intention is to look at the new guarantee fund and reserve from 
the point of view of sound financial management. The more technical aspects of 
the operation of the fund and reserve fall into the field of competence of the 
Budgets committee and will not be addressed here. 
1, TBB DID lQR A GUARAI!'l'BB PUND 
For some years, the Community budget has included guarantees offered to the EIB 
and other financial institutions in support of Community-initiated lending to 
non-Member countries. These have always been written into the budget as token 
entries only, with the effect that, in the case of default, budgetary funds 
would not immediately be available to meet the community's obligations. In 
effect, cash would have to be found either through a supplementary and amending 
budget or through transfers from other areas of expenditure. In either case, 
the potential disruption to the implementation of the budget would be severe. 
This approach to managing contingent liabilities can hardly be considered in 
keeping with sound or prudent financial management, and the Committee on 
Budgetary Control in particular has called on numerous occasions for the 
constitution of a budgetary guarantee fund. There can therefore be no dispute 
over the principle behind the Commission's proposal. 
Furthermore, recent political trends have led to the Community assuming far 
greater guarantee obligations as a result of dramatically increased lending to 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There can be little question that 
the risk attached to this new lending is qualitatively significantly greater 
than that previously assumed, owing to the fragile nature of the economy in 
beneficiary states. Indeed there is already evidence that some countries are 
having difficulties in meeting agreed repayment schedules, with the almost 
inevitable consequence that the Community guarantee will repeatedly be called 
upon over the next few years. 
2 , THJ SIZI Ql 'l'HB GUARANTJB PUNP AND RBSBRVB 
a> rund 
The target size of the new fund is set at 10\ of outstanding capital lent to 
non-Member countries. The commission states that this ratio is in keeping with 
the provisioning practices of international financial institutions such as the 
EIB or EBRD. The comparison however is not an appropriate one. The bodies 
named enjoy high quality debtor portfolios, even in Central and Eastern Europe 
1 COM (93) 20 final 
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and the developing world, largely because they receive first-rate guarantees of 
precisely the sort offered by the Community budget. In the case of the 
Community budget, the risk borne relates directly to the quality of the primary 
debtor itself, namely, in most cases, countries experiencing grave economic 
difficulties. 
In this context, the 10\ target figure has to be viewed with some scepticism. 
By the same token, the rate at which the Community intends to build its 
guarantee fund (payments of 14\ of all new eligible lending) threatens to be 
extremely slow, with the effect that the budget will be in a poor position to 
cover any guarantees called upon over the next two or three years - precisely 
the period where borrowers are likely to encounter the most difficult economic 
conditions. Moreover, in order for even the modest target provision of 10\ of 
outstanding capital to be reached, total lending will have to grow to about 
three and a half times its current level. 
The rapporteur therefore believes that the Commission should re-examine its 
proposals for both the size of the fund and the speed of its constitution. 
The rapporteur's preferred approach would be to make an initial one-off down 
payment from the budget into the Guarantee Fund in order to ensure that there 
is some bud9etary cover for any calls on the Community guarantee in the near 
future. This should be set with reference to the target amount (a third seems 
reasonable, and should be additional to the initial endowment of the Guarantee 
Reserve. On this basis, it would be possible to accept the commission's proposal 
to pay 14\ of all new relevant transactions into the Fund since the Fund would 
effectively have been given a "head start". Moreover this approach would have 
the advantage of not lowering the maximum possible amount of new lending during 
the financial year any further in a period when maximum Community intervention 
is most necessary (see following section). 
Appropriate amendments are submitted to the Budgets committee. 
b> Reserve 
The Commission proposes setting aside a Guarantee Reserve of Ecu 300 million 1 
in the bud9et. It is this which will primarily feed the guarantee fund from 
which payments would be made. Given that payments from the reserve will amount 
to 14\ of all new relevant lending, the reserve will in effect impose an upper 
limit on the total amount lent to non-member countries over the financial year, 
of just over ICU 2 billion. In the event of an increase in the percentage paid 
into the fund, the effective ceiling would of course fall. The potential 
restrictions this might place on the community's lending activities should be 
considered. 
c) Ouantification of risk to budget 
At the end of June 1992 (the latest date for which detailed figures are 
available), the Community had capital of Ecu 3.99 billion outstanding to third 
countries (against an authorised ceiling of 8.74 billion). It is however fair 
1 Art. 13 of parallel proposal on budgetary discipline (also COM(93)20 fin) 
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to say that the maximum risk to the budget on an annual basis is rather 
different, insofar as the Community guarantee would generally only be called 
upon to cover repayments that ware not paid as they fell due. The following 
table represents the commission's estimate of maximum annual risk over the rest 
of the decade (on the basis of loans already agreed or proposed). 
Bstimated maximum annual risk on lending to non-~r countriea1 
MAX ANNUAL RISK '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 TOT. 
Interest 333 677 777 805 774 821 747 675 5609 
Capital 92 236 612 1518 457 1288 1003 1023 6229 
TOTAL 425 913 1389 2323 1231 2109 1750 1698 11838 
It can be seen from the table that the Community will have to lend a great deal 
of new money to build up a guarantee fund appropriate to these figures. Covering 
a modest 10\ of the 1993 potential liability for example would, on current 
proposals, require ECU 652 million of new lending in a short space of time. 
dl The event of default 
The Commission proposes the reconstitution of a depleted guarantee fund (between 
50-75\) with an increase in the rate of contribution to the fund from the 
reserve to 15\. If less than SO\ of the target amount remains, "measures to 
restore the fund" are promised. Again, one has to entertain doubts as to 
whether the fund will be constituted and/or re-constituted quickly enough 
effectively to play its guarantee role. The rapporteur therefore proposes an 
amendment which will introduce the possibility of greater flexibility in the 
reconstitution rate, allowing it to be set at a level appropriate to the real 
needs of the moment. 
3. mm OP CQMMUNITY GUAitANTBB 
The Commission proposal makes no reference to the level of guarantee to be 
offered by the Community budget by the EIB. The rapporteur however believes 
that the moment is appropriate to reconsider the practice of always offering 
lOO\ cover. There is clearly a certain variation in the level of risk assumed 
by the Bank, and the Community guarantee should reflect this. Moreover, the 
Bank would be constrained to take a greater interest in the quality of its 
landing to non-member countries and the nature of the projects financed if it 
bore a proportion of the risk itself. This could only have a beneficial effect 
on the control of lending operations outside the Community and would spread the 
financial risk in a way more closely reflecting the competences of Community 
institutions. This proposal is consistent with the EIB'a new politically 
engaged role in the affairs of the Community - particularly with regard to 
Central and Eastern Europe, and would place the EIB on a par with other 
international institutions providing politically motivated credit. Equally, it 
should not be forgotten that the EIB will continue to enjoy the benefit of full 
1 " Sourcea Guarantees covered by the general budget - 30.6.92" SEC(92)2047 
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state guarantees from beneficiary countries, guarantees moreover which, in the 
case of central and Eastern Europe, are being to be strengthened by the progress 
which has resulted from macro-economic stabilisation plans. 
The rapporteur has therefore tabled an amendment which, as it were, establishes 
this principle in the Commission's proposal, naturally without at this stage 
taking a rigid position on how the system might operate. This latter point 
would clearly be the subject of detailed discussion at a later point. 
4. PJ\RLIMilft'ARY C:OI!TROL 
Leaving aside the details of the proposal, the new guarantee fund and reserve 
do answer many of Parliament's reservations about the lack of cover for 
budgetary guarantees. They do not however resolve the problem of Parliament's 
input into the decision making process. As at present, Parliament will 
presumably continue to be consulted on the granting of a budgetary guarantee 
only when presented with what is effectively a "fait accompli". As such, the 
only influence it can have over the granting of a loan is its rather draconian 
negative power to block the corresponding guarantee. As a matter of principle, 
budgetary authority (as guarantor, and as custodian of taxpayers' rights) should 
have the right of control over the natura of the underlying liability, namely 
eo-decision on the granting of loans in the first place. 
This proposal is therefore a step in the right direction, but cannot be allowed 
to be seen to answer all Parliament's rightful demands. 
5. OOICLU§IOl!S 
To summarises 
The Committee on Budgetary Control should welcome the establishment of the 
guarantee fund and reserve with the following reservations: 
A target size for the Fund of 10\ 
comparisons with the practice 
institutions is probably too low. 
a view on this point. 
of outstanding capital, if based on 
of other international financial 
The Court of Auditors should express 
The rata of constitution of the fund, at 14\ of new loans starting from 
zero, is too slow. Given what is already outstanding, lending would 
have to increase by 250\ to achieve the 10\ target, and, with the 
constraints imposed by the size of the guarantee reserve, this could 
take wall over five years. An initial one-off payment into the fund 
would improve matters by ensuring soma cover in the riskiest period. 
The rata of reconstitution of the fund in case of default is also too 
slow and should be adjusted upwards according to the perceived needs of 
the moment, especially as default by one borrower might well be a signal 
of further defaults on the way. 
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6. RBCQHMIHDATIONS 
The Budgets Committee should make clear in its report that the Commission's 
proposal does not resolve all Parliament's difficulties with system of Community 
landings, particularly as regards Parliament's right of eo-decision on the loans 
themselves. 
It should furthermore address the question of the size of the guarantee reserve 
in the budget, which does not strictly fall under the proposal under 
examination. Parliament should insist on the reserve being of a size 
commensurate with the demands likely to be made on it, and the amount of new 
lending the Community may wish to undertake. 
Additionally, the Committee on Budgetary Control calls on the Committee on 
Budgets, as the Committee responsible, to incorporate the following amendments 
in its report: 
(Amendment No. 1) 
Article 1, first paragraph 
A Guarantee Fund, hereinafter 
referred to as "the Fund", shall be 
established, the purpose of which 
shall be to repay the Community's 
creditors direct in the event of 
default by the beneficiary of a 
lending operation guaranteed by the 
general budget. 
A Guarantee Fund, hereinafter 
referred to as "the Fund", shall be 
established, the purpose of which 
shall be to repay the proportion of 
outstanding amounts covered by the 
Community guarantee to the 
Community's creditors direct in the 
event of default by the beneficiary 
of a lending operation guaranteed by 
the general budget. 
(Amendment No. 2) 
Article 2, new first indent 
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an initial one-off payment from 
the European Investment Bank 
egual to one third of th, target 
amount of the Guarantee Fund, to 
be additional to the initial 
endowment of the Guarantee 
Reserve. 
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(Amendment No. 3) 
Article 3, second paragraph 
The target amount shall be 10\ of the 
Community's outstanding liabilities 
in principal arising from loans and 
loan guarantees granted by the 
community. 
The target amount shall be 
established by the budgetary 
authority after consultation with the 
Court of Auditors and shall be 
subject to periodic review; it shall 
not, in any case, amount to less than 
10% of the Community's outstanding 
liabilities in principal arising from 
loans and loan guarantees granted.by 
the Community. 
(Amendment No. 5) 
Article 4, second indent 
shall be reduced to 10\ when the 
target amount is reached. 
shall be reduced to a level 
appropriate to stabilise and 
maintain the target amount once 
it is reached. 
(Amendment No. 6) 
Article 5, second paragraph 
If a guarantee is activated before 
the Fund reaches its target amount 
and the resources in the Fund fall 
below 75\ of the target amount as a 
result, the rate of provisioning 
shall be raised to 15\ until the 
amount drawn has been fully restored. 
If a guarantee is activated before 
the Fund reaches its target amount 
and the resources in the Fund fall 
below 75\ of the target amount as a 
result, the rate of provisioning 
shall be raised to an appropriate 
higher rate until the amount drawn 
has been fully restored. 
(Amendment No. 7) 
New Article Sa 
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establish guidelines for the 
proportion of the risk on lending to 
non-member mountries to be covered by 
the Community guarantee. 
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